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INTRODUCTION TO THE MEADOR LECTURES ON FIDUCIARIES
Meinhard v. Salmon' offers perhaps one of the best known declarations
of a fiduciary duty in business law. 2 In that case, Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, explored possible fi-
duciary duties among participants in a joint venture.3 Cardozo famously
proclaimed that such "[j]oint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one an-
other, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty.' '4 Al-
though the duty of loyalty examined in Meinhard represents but one type of
fiduciary duty,5 Cardozo's language particularly resonates with the reader as
it captures the most intuitive notion of a fiduciary-one who by his or her
position owes certain others extreme fidelity.
The significance of Cardozo's proclamations in Meinhard extends be-
yond expertly capturing the basic nature of fiduciaries and their duties
through his eloquent word-smithing. While Cardozo's writings in Meinhard
may constitute the prototypical classic legal opinion, they are far from en-
tirely original. His opinion is noteworthy for drawing on a legal tradition of
the fiduciary in addition to originating its own unique phrasing studied by
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law. I thank The University
of Alabama Law School Foundation, Dean Ken Randall, and my colleagues on the law faculty for their
generous support of my research. I also appreciate comments from Norman Stein on an earlier draft and
excellent research assistance from Aaron Shapiro.
1. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
2. Since its issuance, through the decades, numerous courts have cited the opinion. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981); Buffum v. Peter Barceloux Co., 289 U.S. 227, 237
(1933); Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335, 340-41 (9th Cir. 1943); Bakalis v. Bressler, 115
N.E.2d 323, 326 (111. 1953); Sokoloff v. Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 754 N.E.2d 184, 189 (N.Y. 2001);
Howard v. Murray, 372 N.E.2d 568, 570 (N.Y. 1977); Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 223 N.E.2d 869,
874 (N.Y. 1966); Fischer v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 607 N.Y.S.2d 309,311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
3. See Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 545.
4. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
5. In business law alone, courts have proclaimed the existence of other duties, such as the duty of
care. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-36 (1986). And, the increased presence of statu-
tory as well as common law fiduciary duties continues to raise the possible existence of additional,
separate fiduciary duties. See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753-57 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(identifying possible duty of good faith), aftd, 906 A.2d 693 (Del. 2006).
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generations of law students. Although Cardozo found no precedent that ex-
actly mimicked the facts of the case before him, he sought to broadly apply
existing notions of duties developed in equity:
Equity refuses to confine within the bounds of classified transac-
tions its precept of a loyalty that is undivided and unselfish. Certain
at least it is that a "man obtaining his locus standi, and his opportu-
nity for making such arrangements, by the position he occupies as a
partner, is bound by his obligation to his copartners in such dealings
not to separate his interest from theirs, but, if he acquires any bene-
fit, to communicate it to them." Certain it is also that there may be
no abuse of special opportunities growing out of a special trust as
manager or agent.6
Moreover, Cardozo's opinion explicitly reflects his recognition of the place
of his holding in a longer line of precedents chastening fiduciaries about
their conduct. He recognizes the important role of case law in reinforcing a
special level of fidelity for fiduciaries to those with whom they are bound:
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has de-
veloped a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromis-
ing rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned
to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating
erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this
court.
7
Just as Cardozo's opinion is not the first to identify a fiduciary duty, it
is not the last. Notions of fiduciaries and their duties continue to permeate
the law. Their importance only continues to grow. This is reflected both by
efforts to formalize fiduciary duties and to introduce fiduciary concepts into
additional areas of law. Accordingly, it is more important than ever to un-
derstand fiduciaries and their duties, and it is especially appropriate that the
2005-2006 Meador Lectures focus on fiduciaries.8
6. See Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 547-48 (citation omitted) (quoting Cassels v. Stewart, [1881] 6 App.
Cas. 64,73 (H.L.)).
7. Id. at 546 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304
(N.Y. 1927)); cf Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA.
L. REv. 1675, 1692-99 (1990) (evaluating the rhetoric of Meinhard).
8. The Meador Lectures are named in honor of Daniel J. Meador, a graduate of and the former
Dean of The University of Alabama School of Law and the James Monroe Professor of Law Emeritus at
the University of Virginia School of Law.
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FORMALIZATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Formalization of fiduciary duties occurs in various ways. For instance,
law may designate additional, official fiduciaries and also may identify new
duties for a broadening array of fiduciaries. Moreover, law may codify those
fiduciaries' duties to further enshrine their significance and the nuances of
their application.
Because fiduciary doctrine earlier focused on fiduciary duties specifi-
cally arising from certain positions one might hold, 9 law's formal recogni-
tion of additional fiduciaries deserves notice. The number of officially des-
ignated fiduciaries increases with the introduction of new legal vehicles that
utilize fiduciaries in their administration. So today, the earlier fiduciaries,
such as the administrators of simple trusts, are joined by fiduciaries critical
to the supervision of complex plans, such as those envisioned by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Enacted by Congress in
1974 to protect the interests of participants in employer-sponsored retire-
ment and welfare benefit plans, ERISA adopted a broad definition of statu-
tory fiduciaries,10 who are subject to rigorous duties of prudence1 and of
fidelity to plan participants. 2 Accordingly, a plan's investment advisors, its
administrators, its trustees, and others with either discretionary administra-
tive authority or any authority to deal with plan assets, are ERISA fiduciar-
ies. 3
Moreover, the types of fiduciary duties facing those who possess them
are increasingly formalized as those duties become more categorical. In
areas of the law that apply fiduciary principles, it is now common to see a
variety of specific duties, each with their own nuances. For instance, stu-
dents of business organizations law will be familiar not only with the fidu-
ciary duty of loyalty recognized by Cardozo but also with a duty of care.'
4
Accordingly, in addition to violating her duties by taking self-serving action
at the expense of the business entity and associated persons to which she
owes fidelity, a fiduciary also could violate her duties by failing to exercise
required prudence in making decisions on behalf of the entity-even if a
personal benefit does not inure to her through that poor decision-making. 15
Over time, courts further recognized different types of violations of
each of these separately classified duties. Thus, actions classified as viola-
tions of a duty of loyalty might encompass situations where the fiduciary
9. See ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP AND
RESULTING TRUSTS 1 (3d ed. 1955) (noting confinement of doctrine "to persons occupying certain
recognised fiduciary positions, such as trustees and guardians" prior to being "extended to embrace all
those who are placed in any position of trust").
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000).
11. See id. § 1104(a)(1 )(B). ERISA also imposes an explicit duty of investment diversification. See
id. § 1104(a)(l)(C).
12. See id. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
13. See id. § 1002(21)(A).
14. See CLARK, supra note 5, at 123-36.
15. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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takes an opportunity from the entity to which she owes a duty of loyalty 16 as
well as cases where she engages in other conflicts of interest or self-
interested transactions with that entity. 17 As courts and policy-makers more
formally distinguish the nuances of different types of fiduciary violations, it
becomes possible to craft a variety of legal tests for determining when fidu-
ciary violations occur.
1 8
Codification of guidance on various fiduciary duties over time indicates
further formalization of these duties and their increasingly nuanced nature.
For example, "Section 8.70 [of the Model Business Corporation Act
(MBCA)] provides a safe harbor for a director weighing possible involve-
ment with a prospective business opportunity that might constitute a 'corpo-
rate opportunity.""19 As noted above, limitations on the taking of corporate
opportunities from an entity that one owes fidelity constitutes an important
part of a fiduciary's duty of loyalty.20 Accordingly, it is an important legal
development to provide a road map-in this instance involving disclosure
and approval by other parties of the taking of an opportunity-that a fiduci-
ary might use to avoid violating his position of trust in the eyes of the law.2'
Similarly, Subchapter F of the MBCA provides important guidance on con-
flicts of interest transactions, another possible pitfall under the duty of loy-
alty.22 Taken together with other efforts to identify new fiduciaries and
separate fiduciary duties, such codification indicates the increased formality
of the law of fiduciaries which in turn reflects the growing importance of
fiduciaries.
16. See FRANKLIN A. GEVuRTZ, CORPORATION LAW 362-74 (2000).
17. See id. at 321-62.
18. See, e.g., Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1148-52 (Me. 1995) (contrasting
different jurisdictions' approaches to corporate opportunity doctrine cases with the American Law Insti-
tute's approach in its Principles of Corporate Governance).
19. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.70 cmt. (Supp. 2005).
20. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.70 cmt. (dis-
cussing common law doctrine on corporate opportunity).
21. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.70. Alternative codification efforts also have attempted to
address corporate opportunity issues. See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05 (1994).
22. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, ch. 8, subchap. F. Of note, in Delaware, codification
helped to frame a debate over whether a separate duty of good faith existed alongside the duties of care
and loyalty. Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Code provides corporations with the
ability to limit director liability for some fiduciary duty breaches, but not, among other items, for "any
breach of the director's duty of loyalty" or "for acts or omissions not in good faith." DEL. GEN. CORP. L.
§ 102(b)(7) (2004). The legislature's choice not simply to state that corporations could exculpate direc-
tors only for violations of a duty of care-the intended purpose of section 102(b)(7)-but to state that
corporations cannot exculpate bad faith behavior, potentially implies separate legal significance of that
particular behavior. See CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 346-63 (5th ed. 2006). In tandem with Delaware case law discussing
good faith, including opinions related to the recent Disney litigation, a debate arises as to whether a
separate duty of good faith now exists. See id.; see also Kenneth M. Rosen, Mickey Can You Spare a
Dime? DisneyWar, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Business Law Pedagogy, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1151 (2007) (discussing the Disney litigation).
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APPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY CONCEPTS IN ADDITIONAL AREAS
Further reflecting the significance of fiduciaries to the U.S. legal system
is the importation of fiduciary concepts into increasingly diverse areas of
the law. 23 These principles have proven useful even where formally desig-
nated fiduciaries are not obviously present. Such use is longstanding. As
noted in the above discussion of Meinhard, Cardozo utilized earlier fiduci-
ary notions from the world of equity to craft his opinion on the law of co-
adventurers. Not surprisingly, later jurists drew from Cardozo's eloquently
stated vision of fiduciary fidelity in other contexts.
For instance, Cardozo's successors on the New York Court of Appeals
cited Meinhard in addressing an alleged unfair bargain of an attorney. How-
ard v. Murray involved the court of appeals revisiting an "action to rescind
a mortgage, bond and option arrangement[," where "[iln essence, the plain-
tiffs claim[ed] that the defendant, an attorney specializing in tax law, took
unfair advantage of the attorney-client relationship in contriving the agree-
ments.., sought to be avoided., 24 The opinion suggests allegations that the
defendant attorney "had originally been consulted for tax advice on the
plaintiffs' desired sale or refinancing of their primary capital asset-a lot
and commercial building" and that "the defendant in the end acquired for
himself 'the right to purchase.., property at an amount considerably below
its actual value.' ' 25 In recalling the case's initial evaluation by the court of
appeals, writing for the majority, Judge Wachtler asserted:
The bargain itself was patently one-sided. We could not say at
that point and on that basis alone, however, that the underlying
agreement was unfair as a matter of law. Instead we remitted the
matter to the Appellate Division for appropriate review in light of
our preliminary analysis. Having yet to review the merits, it was for
that court to first respond to the essence of the fairness problem:
"The crucial question is whether the defendant attorney established
that the contract 'was made by the client with full knowledge of all
material circumstances known to the attorney, . . .and that a rea-
sonable use was made by the attorney of the confidence reposed in
him."'
This classic formulation of the legal standard to be applied on
remission assumes a level of scrutiny far "stricter than the morals of
the market place. 26
23. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 795 (1983) (recognizing various types
of fiduciaries in numerous areas of the law).
24. 372 N.E.2d 568, 569 (N.Y. 1977).
25. Id. at 569 (quoting Howard v. Murray, 346 N.E.2d 238, 239 (N.Y. 1976)).
26. Id. at 569-70 (citations omitted) (quoting Howard, 346 N.E.2d at 239, and Meinhard v. Salmon,
164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
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Thus, the court of appeals infused the settlement of this dispute related to
the attorney-client relationship with the spirit of Cardozo's proclamations of
fidelity owed by persons in special positions of trust. It seems especially
significant that fiduciary concepts now permeate the conception of the legal
profession and lawyers' relationship with their clients.27
Moreover, the extension of fiduciary concepts to additional areas of the
law is not limited to law governing the behavior of members of the legal
profession. Creative uses of these concepts know few bounds. 28 Some appli-
cations may be more advisable than others. But regardless of the merits of
individual applications, the pervasiveness of attempts to utilize fiduciary
concepts, at a minimum, make it necessary to further the dialogue on fiduci-
aries and their duties.
THE MEADOR LECTURES ON FIDUCIARIES
In the 2005-2006 Meador Lectures, three preeminent scholars-
Professors Deborah A. DeMott,29 John H. Langbein, 30 and Jill E. Fisch 3-
offer their own views on fiduciaries. In doing so, they contribute greatly to
our understanding of the trends to formalize fiduciary principles and to ap-
ply fiduciary concepts in a widespread fashion.
Professor DeMott revisits the fiduciary duty of loyalty in the context of
agency law.32 The context is especially appropriate because fiduciary con-
cepts often share consideration with those from agency law.33 As Professor
DeMott observes, some define agency itself as a fiduciary relationship. Yet,
that cannot be the end of a nuanced understanding of agency's fiduciary
27. The lawyer's role as fiduciary continues to be a subject for vigorous dialogue. See, e.g., Lester
Brickman, The Continuing Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection: Ethics 2000's Revision of
Model Rule 1.5,2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181.
28. See, e.g., John Burritt McArthur, The Restatement (First) of the Oilfield Operator's Fiduciary
Duty, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 587 (2005) (discussing possible recognition of oilfield operator fiduciary
responsibilities); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117
(2006) (exploring a model of administrative law utilizing fiduciary notions); Paul B. Miller & Charles
Weijer, Fiduciary Obligation in Clinical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 424, 424 (2006) (calling for
"recognition of the fiduciary nature of the relationship between patient-subject and physician-
researcher"); Sara R. Kusiak, Comment, The Case for A. U. (Accountable Universities): Enforcing Uni-
versity Administrator Fiduciary Duties Through Student Derivative Suits, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 129, 134
(2006) (arguing analogy of students to members of nonprofit corporations and that judges should "allow
them to bring derivative suits to enforce the fiduciary duties that university presidents and trustees owe
to the school"); Alexandria Streich, Comment, Spousal Fiduciaries in the Marital Partnership: Mar-
riage Means Business But the Sharks Do Not Have a Code of Conduct, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 367 (1998)
(exploring fiduciary duties of spouses); Jennifer L. White, Note, When It's OK to Sell the Monet: A
Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art To Meet Museum Operat-
ing Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1041 (1996) (using fiduciary concepts to discuss sale of art by muse-
ums).
29. Professor DeMott is the David F. Cavers Professor of Law at Duke University School of Law.
30. Professor Langbein is the Sterling Professor of Law and Legal History at Yale University.
31. Professor Fisch is the T.J. Maloney Professor of Business Law and Director of the Center for
Corporate, Securities and Financial Law at Fordham Law School.
32. See Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1048 (2007).




story. Separate types of fiduciary duties are important because they derive
from different legal principles, possess distinctive purposes, and result in
unique consequences. Consequently, the presence of a fiduciary duty of
loyalty, as opposed to other duties, truly matters. Professor DeMott's analy-
sis belies characterizations of the fiduciary duty of loyalty as a product en-
tirely of tort or contract theory and usefully explores the very specific con-
sequences and remedies arising out of an agent's violation of a duty of loy-
alty. In distinguishing the duty of loyalty from performance duties, Profes-
sor DeMott reinforces the impact of fiduciary's duties' categorization over
time.
Professor Langbein focuses on fiduciaries in another classic context-
trust law-and, in doing so, further illuminates why codification of fiduci-
ary principles is so momentous. 34 He updates the story of codification by
reflecting on the Uniform Trust Code of 2000 and its adoption by various
states as part of a larger story of trust law moving from judge constructed
law to statute law. As he explains, while the Uniform Trust Code might be
viewed as "the first national-level codification of the American law of
trusts," it nonetheless follows in the wake of other uniform acts of the last
century that helped to shape trust law in the United States.35 Although trust
law and its principles are longstanding, Professor Langbein proffers why
statutory law is increasingly significant for trust law's development as it is
with rapidly developing and complex new areas of the law that rely on stat-
utes for quick implementation of legal change. He suggests that the very
nature of trusts and their purposes changed over the last century, making it
important to quickly implement those changes in statute to reflect the
changing tasks of the trustee that acts as a fiduciary-trustees engaged in
very active management of different types of assets than their predecessors.
Thus, the formalization of fiduciary principles through codification pos-
sesses very practical consequences.
Finally, Professor Fisch provides important insight into attempts to ap-
ply fiduciary concepts across a broadening swath of the law.36 She reflects
on the regulation of research analysts following problems at various public
companies from Enron to WorldCom. Such failures raised questions about
potential biases of analysts that study such companies and whether those
analysts should be regulated as fiduciaries. Although such regulation might
be attractive to some, Professor Fisch identifies costs of enforcing any man-
datory independence for analysts and their treatment as fiduciaries. She
suggests that more limited reforms, short of fiduciary liability with its ac-
companying uncertain scope, might prove the best solution. In reaching her
conclusions, Professor Fisch contrasts the role of analysts with that of other
individuals with heightened independence requirements, such as public
34. See John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United States?, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 1069 (2007).
35. Id. at 1069-71.
36. See Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083 (2007).
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auditors. Significantly, she imparts an important lesson-caution must pre-
cede wholesale incorporation of fiduciary concepts into additional areas of
the law.
Thus, taken together, the following Meador Lectures reveal both the
growing importance of the law of fiduciaries as well as that law's limits.
